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Paper1 by Iryna Solonenko2 
 
UKRAINE AND THE EU AFTER UKRAINE’S PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTIONS 2012: HOW TO BREAK THE STALEMATE? 
 
 
Introduction. EU-Ukraine relationship under Yanukovych: from honeymoon to 
deadlock 
 
Developments in Ukraine since February 2010 when Viktor Yanukovych became the 
President have exceeded many pessimistic expectations. The political instability and 
infighting during Yushchenko-Tymoshenko tandem produced a lot of disappointment and 
fatigue, therefore there were hopes that under Yanukovych better management and 
predictability were to be expected. Many analysts claimed that even if Yanukovych would 
decide to move too far in the direction of concentrating power, a lot of safeguards against 
potential authoritarian trends existed in Ukraine. It was argued that oligarchs became used 
to political competition and would not tolerate a one man rule; they would be the first ones 
to stand up and protect the liberties. It was also argued that the West, furthermost the EU, 
would strengthen its pressure and that no Ukrainian leader would be able to afford 
withstanding this pressure: the EU was too an important partner for a country like Ukraine 
that needed to balance against the big northern neighbour. Finally, it was believed, that 
civil society would at the very least draw the red lines beyond which no power man would 
be able to step and risk provoking social instability.3 Many of these hopes did not 
materialise.  
 
Looking back at developments over the past two and a half years shows that Ukraine has 
lacked many constraints or safeguards outlined above. What Yanukovych has managed to 
'achieve' during this time and how immune he has stayed to the external and domestic 
pressure is surprising. Ukraine's democracy performance as assessed by many 
international indices, such as Freedom House or Bertelsmann Transformation Stiftung has 
deteriorated significantly4. Ukraine's business climate, according to Doing Business rating, 
has also dropped significantly5. Ukraine's judiciary has found itself under the total political 
control. Freedom of assembly, freedom of expression along with many other indispensable 
political and personal freedoms have become seriously constrained, while corruption has 
reached an even higher scale. The 2010 local elections were not free and fair and marked 
a step back as compared to all elections Ukraine held since the Orange Revolution 
(December 2004). The most recent parliamentary elections that took place on 28 October 
                                                 
1 The draft paper was presented during the Deutsch-Nordisch-Baltisches Forum 2012 in Helsinki on 27-28 September 
2012 and amended after the parliamentary elections in Ukraine took place on 28 October 2012. 
2 Iryna Solonenko is a researcher at the European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder) 
3 See, for instance, Gromadzki, Grzegorz; Movchan, Veronika; Riabchuk, Mykola; Solonenko, Iryna; Stewart, Susan; 
Sushko, Oleksandr and Wolczuk, Kataryna. Beyond Colours: Assets and Liabilities of ‘Post-Orange’ Ukraine. Kyiv and 
Warsaw: International Renaissance Foundation and Stefan Batory Foundation, 2010. accessed 15 October 2012, 
http://www.irf.ua/files/ukr/beyond%20colours.pdf 
4 Freedom in the World 2012. Freedom House, 2012. Accessed October 2012, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2012. Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2011. 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012. Accessed October 2012, http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-
8D417F3B-61EA1F72/bst_engl/hs.xsl/307.htm 
5 Doing Business 2013. World Bank. Accessed October 2012, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
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2012 also saw major manipulations during the election campaign, on the day of voting and 
even during the counting and tabulation of votes. Yanukovych has de facto established a 
one party rule, while oligarchs have agreed to play by his rules. The EU has appeared to 
matter little to Yanukovych in the context of his domestic power agenda. Domestic 
opposition and activities of civil society have mattered, but only to a limited extent. They 
insured alternative opinions and sometimes succeeded in promoting or blocking certain 
decisions, but have had marginal impact on undermining the system as such. 
 
These developments have had profound implications for EU-Ukraine relationship. The EU 
has reacted with disappointment and warnings, although belated. For instance, the EU did 
not react to early warning signals, such as the creation of the parliamentary coalition with 
major procedural violations in April 2010 or the adoption of legislation on judiciary in May-
June 2010 that strengthened political control over judiciary. Amending the Constitution by a 
mare decision of the court in September 2010 that brought Ukraine back to the presidential 
system was another step. Yet the red line, which brought the EU-Ukraine relationship to 
the stalemate was that of selective justice. The imprisonment of some ten former Ukrainian 
officials, but most of all the former prime-minister and the leader of opposition Yulia 
Tymoshenko was the step the EU could not tolerate. Even worse, Yanukovych created an 
impression that he was willing to 'correct the mistake' and the fact that this impression was 
false was the last drop.  
 
Due to these developments, further progress in EU-Ukraine relationship has been put on 
hold. In December 2011 the EU and Ukraine announced that they finalised negotiating the 
Association Agreement (AA). The AA was initialed in March and July (the DCFTA part) 
2012. Yet, the EU has delayed the decision about signature of the AA. The EU also 
postponed the EU-Ukraine Summit – an event, which took place annually  since 1997 
when the PCA with Ukraine came into force. As the result no Summit will take place in 
2012, although according to the official version it was postponed till early 2013.  
 
The parliamentary elections that took place on 28 October 2002 are perceived as an 
important benchmark by the EU. The way the EU ultimately assess the elections will serve 
as an important reference point for the subsequent policy towards Ukraine. While the EU is 
supposed to take the decision on November 19 – this is when the EU foreign ministers 
meet, the OSCE has already given a fairly critical preliminary assessment6. Previously the 
EU mentioned that the OSCE assessment will be crucial for the EU’s own standpoint. 
 
Apart from the importance of the quality of elections the EU has never put forward a 
concise list of criteria under which it would be ready to move towards signing the AA. Yet, 
looking at different media statements by Commissioner Fuele and other EU officials it can 
be inferred that two other conditions are implied – dealing with selective justice (read: 
release of ‘political prisoners’ Tymoshenko and Lutsenko) and implementation of 
Association Agenda7 priorities, particularly carrying out the reform of judiciary.  
 
                                                 
6 Internaional Election Observation. Ukraine – Parliamentary Elections, 28 October 2012. Statement of Preliminary 
Findings and Conclusions. OSCE/ODIHR. Accessed October 2012, 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/96675. 
7  Association Agenda is the second generation Action Plan between the EU and each of its Eastern Partnership 
neighbour. Ukraine started implementing the Association Agenda in 2010. Its priorities are being updated annually. 
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The way the elections and especially the vote counting were carried out significantly limits 
the space for manoeuvre for the EU. It is clear that the elections were not free and fair. 
Moreover the imprisoned leaders of political opposition were not let free. In this situation 
the EU cannot continue ‘business as usual’ and go forward with the Association 
Agreement, but look for a ‘Plan B’ for Ukraine.  
 
The EU's dilemma: the EU’s ‘transformative power’ and Eastern Partnership Policy 
under the risk 
 
Due to Ukraine the EU faces a profound dilemma, which extends beyond EU-Ukraine 
relationship as such, but touches upon the entire Eastern Partnership policy. Ukraine used 
to be the flagship country of the European Neighbourhood Policy and later on that of the 
Eastern Partnership. Now it is lagging behind Moldova and Georgia not only in the domain 
of democracy, but on many other aspects of Europeanisation as confirmed by independent 
expert assessments8. Ukraine was the first EaP country with whom the EU started 
negotiating its unprecedented Association Agreement. The latter entails deep and 
comprehensive free trade area and acquis approximation that comes near to the level of 
commitments the accession countries normally have to undertake. The AA with Ukraine 
was supposed to serve as a model agreement for other EaP countries. Moreover, the AA is 
perceived to be the most important instrument offered by the Eastern Partnership policy. 
Therefore, the AA with Ukraine was supposed to serve as the 'success story' of the EU’s 
policy towards its Eastern neighbours.  
 
In this situation, on the one hand, the EU cannot compromise on its values by going 
forward with signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine. This is especially true now 
after parliamentary elections were not recognised by OSCE as such that met democratic 
standards. Moreover, obvious abuses took place during the vote count and tabulation: the 
Party of Regions candidates were recognised as winners in several single-mandate 
constituencies where de facto oppositional candidates won. Wide-spread reporting of 
abuses and protests on the ground did not help to ensure the ultimately fair outcome.  
 
Importantly, such a move on the part of the EU would undermine its ‘more for more’ 
principle, which was put at the basis of its European Neighbourhood Policy. Thus, signing 
the AA with Ukraine will not only undermine EU’s credibility, but might also send wrong 
signals to other countries as to what standards of democracy the EU expects from a 
country with which it is ready to sign the Association Agreement.  
 
On the other hand, without the AA the EU might risk losing any leverage over Ukraine. The 
potential ‘Plan B’ has never been discussed. The question of what the EU can do\ what 
would be the right alternative policy if the EU decides that signing the AA under the current 
conditions would be inappropriate, remains open. What other leverages, if any, does the 
EU have to promote reforms in Ukraine? At the same time the AA as a legally binding 
framework might help to push forward implementation of EU standards. Thus, the EU 
faces the choice between, on the one hand. ‘loosing face’, but potentially preserving some 
leverage over Ukraine and, on the other hand, being consistent and guided by principles, 
but losing any leverage altogether. 
 
                                                 
8 See European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries - www.eap-index.eu 
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The whole situation also questions the EU's 'transformative power' towards countries like 
Ukraine. It shows that the attractiveness of the Association Agreement is weak and the 
cost of potential isolation from the EU is not big enough from the perspective of domestic 
power struggle in Ukraine.  
 
Beyond the specific Ukrainian dilemma the question of the future of the Eastern 
Partnership remains open. Without having the precedent of the AA concluded with one of 
the EaP countries the EU risks to compromise the credibility of its EaP policy. Since the 
EaP was launched in 2009 there has been hardly a success story the EU can sell. There is 
already a lot of disappointment with the policy in the EU. If no success story is created, 
things might become problematic.  
 
What would be the way out? The next chapters of this paper offer a closer look at 
developments in Ukraine focusing on interests of different domestic actors and some 
down-to-earth processes and suggest the possible strategies for the EU. 
 
Understanding developments and trends in Ukraine: diversity of actors as a chance 
 
In order to better understand which way Ukraine is actually heading and subsequently 
discus possible actions on the part of the EU, one has to look beyond developments in 
Ukraine that have to do with Yanukovych and his policy, but look at the variety of actors, 
interests and trends in Ukraine at different levels. Even if the EU's direct leverage with 
respect to political elites (the incumbents and more specifically Yanukovych and his 
'family'/'clan') might be limited, the EU has the chance to influence indirectly by 
empowering those groups/actors that lose from the lack of reforms and the stalemate in 
EU-Ukraine relations. By empowering those actors the EU can promote the change from 
within. Moreover, the EU can support development of institutions, procedures and good 
practices at different levels that would bring results once the political climate changes. This 
is a long-term strategy, which can bare fruits in the long-term perspective. Over-
expectations after shot-term successes and disappointments when things do not work are 
equally counter-productive. 
 
Developments in Ukraine since Yanukovych became the president and his Party of 
Regions created the majority in the parliament show that the incumbent president is 
interested in further strengthening his power and monopolising Ukrainian political space. 
For the sake of this objective Yanukovych is ready to compromise relationship with the EU. 
The most recent electoral process and the vote counting, which were marked by heavy 
use of administrative resources, confirm this. Yet, Yanukovych’s objective faces constraints 
that have to do with multiple actors in the country that might have other objectives. Even if 
those actors have so far refrained from or failed to prevent the monopolisation of power, 
they potentially limit Yanukovych’s space for manoeuvre. The EU needs to think how it can 
use these multiple actors in its policy towards Ukraine. 
 
 Oligarchs – business-political elites who largely control the situation in the country would 
be the first group of actors to consider. Although the widely-shared hope of many analysts 
before Yanukovych became the President that oligarchs will serve as the safeguard 
against the monopolisation of power did not prove to be true, oligarchs are playing the 
double game. On the one hand they agreed to play by the rules set up by Yanukovych. 
They stay away from politics in the sense that they do not create any public political 
opposition to Yanukovych as long as their business interests are satisfied (for instance, 
through non-transparent privatization or access to public funds). On the other hand the 
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most recent parliamentary elections showed that there was no coordinated strategy by 
oligarchs aimed at supporting the ruling Party of Regions. The oligarchs have rather 
promoted their own candidates with the objective to diversify channels of influence on the 
legislature. Thus, according to one journalist investigation9, since the Party of Regions is 
mostly dominated by the people loyal to Renat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest man, the so-
called ‘gas lobby’ in Ukrainian politics represented by, inter alia, Ukraine’s media magnat 
and former security chief Valeriy Horoshkovsky, partially supported oppositional UDAR 
party headed by prominent boxer Vitalii Klychko. At the same time, another Ukrainian 
oligarch Viktor Pinchuk, who is known for his pro-European orientation and the annual 
high-level meetings in Yalta10, has secured his candidates in different party lists and in 
single-mandate constituencies. This speaks for the fact that the oligarchs are diversifying 
channels of influence in the parliament and might play their own game, not that of 
Yanukovych and his ‘family’ if needed. Business interests of some oligarchs are linked with 
the EU and its market, some of them have started investing in production standards 
demanded by the EU. Indefinite postponement of the Association Agreement as the result 
of Yanukovych’s policy might not be in their interest.  
 
The political opposition has shown some signs of consolidation in Ukraine. There was an 
attempt to coordinate efforts and agree on single candidates in single-mandate 
constituencies. After the elections the three oppositional parties that made it to the 
parliament tried to come up with a joint action plan as a reaction to brutal falsifications with 
the vote counting and mobilise voters to protest. If these efforts succeed, the opposition 
might have a sufficient number of votes to withstand the majority coalition of the Party of 
Regions and the Communists. This consolidation might be superficial and short-term. It is 
not clear whether the opposition will be able to jointly insist and win the case of 13 single-
mandate constituencies where de-facto oppositional candidates won, yet the victory of the 
ruling party candidates was announced. It is also not clear whether the opposition will stay 
together once the new parliament is formed. A more long-term problem with the current 
political opposition is that so far it has offered no ideological and substantive opposition. It 
has failed to offer alternative vision and substance to many developments in Ukraine 
promoted by the Party of Regions since Yanukovych became the President. Moreover, 
most oppositional leaders and members of opposition cannot be considered to be new 
quality political elites. In most cases they are also backed up by oligarchs and held high 
level decision making positions in previous governments. The relatively new players – far-
right party Svoboda and the party led by the prominent boxer Vitalii Klychko UDAR that 
have made it to the parliament for the first time might be regarded as the exception. Yet, 
any conclusions at this stage are premature and the work in the parliament will become 
the reality check. The main function of the opposition in the new parliament will be that of 
ensuring political competition, promoting initiatives and legislation that would bring Ukraine 
closer to the EU and withstanding attempts of the Party of Regions to strengthen 
authoritarian trends in Ukraine. It remains to be seen whether the opposition proves 
capable of performing these tasks. Importantly, the political oposition can be considered as 
more EU-oriented than the Party of Regions. Their rethoric and political programmes refer 
to the EU, while their eletorate, mostly in Kyiv, Western and partially Central Ukraine is 
largerly pro-European. 
                                                 
9 Leshchenko, Sergii. “Ukrainian Elections: the Oligarchs are Hedging Their Bets,” Open Democracy (24 October 
2012), accessed October 27, 2012, http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/sergii-leshchenko/ukrainian-elections-
oligarchs-are-hedging-their-bets 
 
10 See Yalta European Strategy for more details – accessed October 25, http://yes-ukraine.org/en/Yalta-annual-meeting. 
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Civil society in Ukraine has become more active than ever before. To some extent the 
regime of Yanukovych has provoked mobilisation of civil society. Particularly, the human 
rights community, journalists and anti-corruption organisations had to react to negative 
developments with the freedom of media, freedom of assembly and public procurement 
practices that led to big amounts of public money ending up in private pockets. The 2012 
parliamentary elections were seen as an important test for the maturity or lack of 
democracy in Ukraine, the real intentions of the regime and the quality of political 
opposition. Therefore numerous civil society election-related initiatives were launched and 
proved to be successful. As the very least, Ukrainian civil society has managed to provide 
regular and detailed updates on the electoral campaign and the day of voting. Due to 
internet and social networks information was quick and easily available. It is true, that 
although active and vibrant, civil society has so far had limited impact on the reform 
process and preventing consolidation of Yanukovych’s power. Reaching out to people has 
also remained problematic. Yet, it offers alternative information and views on 
developments in Ukraine that partially have impact on public opinion and limits the space 
for manoeuvre for political elites. This group of actors is explicitly pro-European. Civil 
society actors refer to EU standards and practicies in their work and have built a tense 
network of working contacts with counterparts in the EU, be it donors, decision-makers or 
civil society organisations.They can be regarded as agents of change and Europeanisation 
in Ukraine. 
 
This constellation of actors and interests in Ukraine represents a very diversified 
landscape and plurality of visions as to which way Ukraine should be moving. Although 
Yanukovych and his immediate entourage have managed to promote and consolidate the 
model that best serves their particularistic interests, alternative opinions have existed and 
shaped the public discourse. This diversity of actors is the resource the EU should 
encourage and rely on. Among those actors the EU can find reform partners who can 
promote Ukraine’s Europeanisation and might be able to challenge the regime in the long-
term perspective. 
 
After October 2012 elections: how to move forward? 
 
One of the mistakes the EU has tended to make with respect to Ukraine is that of creating 
overexpectations, which are naturally followed by disappointments. Those are often 
created based on some short-term developments in Ukraine without having an in-depth 
look at the potential and basis for long-term changes. For instance, after the Orange 
Revolution or after Yanukovych became the President overexpectations were related to 
speedy democratisation and Europeanisation in the first case and more predictability and 
stability in the latter case. None of the expectations materialised due to prevalence of 
particularistic interests and lack of political will to promote reforms and create institutions 
that would safeguard long-term changes. Overexpectations where created based on 
wishful thinking or some normative assumptions as to how things should be. 
Overexpectations produced strong disappointment and fatigue on the part of the EU once 
it became clear that things were not moving in the right direction. This happened with 
respect to the Orange authorities some years after the Orange Revolution due to constant 
political infighting and with respect to Yanukovych once it became clear that he was ready 
to compromise relationship with the EU in order to promote his domestic power agenda. 
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The EU should get away from this approach, which reflects a rather short-term thinking. 
No new authorities that come to power in Ukraine can be committed to democratic rules of 
the game until the system of checks and balances is functional and embedded in 
institutions. Whatever political elites come to power in Ukraine, there will be numerous 
factors that will hinder political will. Unless institutions that create a level-playing field for 
political elites are set up and start functioning, there are too few reasons to expect a new 
quality reform process in Ukraine. Under these circumstances, ups and downs in domestic 
developments in Ukraine and possible abuse of power are only natural and have to be 
accounted for. In this situation the EU needs to be consistent with its offer (incentives), 
keep reiterating the conditions under which the offer can be given and be serious about 
the principles that have to be respected.  
 
What does this mean for the immediate context after the parliamentary elections 
took place in Ukraine?  
 
There is no way for the EU to go forward with signing the Association Agreement with 
Ukraine. Parliamentary elections were carried out with major violations and there is no 
sight of political will to follow up on the EU demands, such as release of political prisoners 
and  reform of judiciary. By signing the AA with Ukraine the EU will compromise on its 
principle of shared values. The EU will also undermine its ‘more for more’ principle. At the 
same time Moldova and Georgia have emerged as success story. Moldova is well on track 
and has good chances to conclude AA negotiations this year. The EU needs to support this 
process and possibly sign the AA with Moldova ahead of the Eastern Partnership Summit 
to be held in Vilnius in autumn 2013. If the new government in Georgia shows political will 
and readiness to carry out reforms, the EU should sign the AA with Georgia once the 
negotiations are over. These developments will show the EU’s transformative power and 
the work of the more-for-more principle. They will create the context where it will become 
clear to Ukraine that there is a cause-effect relationship between the domestic reform 
process and closer ties with the EU. Such developments in Ukraine’s immediate 
neighbourhood will inevitably stimulate changes in Ukraine. In other words, the EU can 
encourage constructive competition among its Eastern Partnership neighbours to 
compliment and support its bilateral work with each neighbour. 
 
Yet, what would be the ‘Plan B’ for Ukraine? In the current Ukrainian situation the 
incentives are clear. In the short term perspective the Association Agreement with the 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area as its integral part and delivery of financial 
assistance that was put on hold11 are at stake. In the longer run one can talk about visa 
free travel through implementation of the Visa Free Action Plan. At the same time the 
conditions under which the incentives can be delivered have been communicated in a very 
vague way. Thus, the EU needs to reiterate the incentives and outline clear conditions for 
delivery of these incentives. Both the substance of the conditions  and the way they are 
communicated are important. Where the substance is concerned, the conditions have to 
be very specific and measurable. Where communication is concerned, those have to be 
brought to the attention of society, not just political elites. The society has to know the price 
(what it has to lose) of the lack of political will and stagnation of reforms.  
 
                                                 
11 The EU put on hold 610 million Eur of macro-financial assistance and over 200 million Eur that are a pat of the direct 
budget support. The main reason was the public procurement legislation and practiciest that are against European 
standards, but also lead to large-scale misuse of public funds. According to some media information the EU was 
ready to consider delivery of the funds under the condition of free and fair parliamentary elections in Ukraine. 
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Thus, once the new parliament starts working, the EU should make it clear that the 
Association Agreement is on the table. Once the AA is signed and comes into force, it will 
create a new quality framework for the EU-Ukraine relations. The EU needs to work on 
communicating the benefits of the Association Agenda to the society and encourage the 
Ukrainian government to communicate the relevant information (up to publishing parts the 
text of the AA) to its people. Yet, the EU cannot sign the documents unless certain specific 
conditions are met. As mentioned above, the content and the way in which the conditions 
are communicated are equally important. Where the content is concerned, the EU can 
again stress the problem of selective justice and demand the release of oppositional 
leaders, as this condition was communicated long ago and has so far not been fulfilled. 
Secondly, the EU needs to communicate specific reform areas of the Association Agenda 
that should be in the focus. Those have to do with fundamental freedoms and human 
rights, judicial reform, business climate and transparency of public spending. Those have 
become the most problematic areas in the recent years and have led to major criticism on 
the part of domestic civil society and international actors, primarily the EU, Council of 
Europe and the World Bank. Where communication is concerned, it is not enough to 
communicate those to political elites via diplomatic channels. More importantly, those 
should become an instrument of domestic advocacy and pressure on the part of society 
and reform-minded groups.  
 
A good way to combine a concrete substance and good communication would be 
something similar to the Commissioner Füle's Matrix of 2010 – specific, clear and doable 
reform steps that the EU expects Ukraine to implement after the elections. Subsequent 
developments should be monitored. The mistake with the Füle's Matrix was that it was not 
delivered publicly (although it was leaked to media), it was not presented as reiteration of 
the offer and conditions that were already on the table, but rather as something new or 
supplementary, and it was never followed up (monitored) by the EU itself. Additionally, the 
leverage of the document was weakened by the fact that it was presented as the invention 
of the Commissioner Füle, not the instrument agreed by the EU. The importance of such a 
document cannot be overestimated, as this would serve as an important reference point 
for the society and reform-minded actors and encourage domestic pressure for reforms. 
 
Long term policy towards Ukraine should be aimed at supporting development of the 
critical mass of actors, institutions and practises that are reform-minded. Results cannot be 
expected overnight. Such a policy would include day-to-day involvement and reactions 
(including public reactions) to developments in Ukraine. Constant pressure on the part of 
the EU in itself might not make a big difference, but it would inevitably limit the space for 
manoeuvre for the incumbents and at the same time strengthen the already existing 
domestic pressure. Given the multiple actors with different interests in Ukraine, as outlined 
above, the EU needs to diversify its tools to take account of those actors. In shot, limiting 
the space for manoeuvre for veto players and help to strengthen the power base of reform-
minded actors should be a long term strategy of the EU. 
 
Simultaneously the EU should continue supporting reform efforts in those areas, which are 
less contested and some progress has been achieved. In most cases these are down to 
earth and technical reforms. Once the political climate changes and Ukraine and the EU 
will be ready to sign the AA, better preparedness of institutions and some good practises 
will help to implement the AA. For instance, implementation of numerous technical 
standards which are important for the free trade area with the EU has become more active 
in Ukraine. Reforms related to requirements of the European Energy Community, more 
specifically the reform of the gas market, have gained some momentum. Reforms required 
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by the Visa Free Action Plan have good chance to be fostered after the new parliament is 
formed. The EU needs to support this down to earth sectoral Europeanisation thus 
preparing Ukraine for the future Association Agreement.   
 
To sum up, given current developments in Ukraine, signing the Association Agreement 
would be unwise. As mentioned above, this would undermine the EU’s credibility and 
potentially leverage towards all Eastern neighbours. The EU needs to go ahead with the 
more committed neighbours, namely Moldova and Georgia and announce clear conditions 
under which the AA with Ukraine could be signed. In the meanwhile the EU could support 
Europeanisation in different sectors, which are important for implementation of the 
Association Agreement.   
